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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal of a decision in a
domestic relations case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(h) (2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error when, by inference, it

imputed to Petitioner/Appellant, Rita Richins ("Rita"), a marital asset consisting of gross
unpaid earnings of $3,800.00 per month for every month from July 1, 1998 through May
10, 2005, for a total of $312,740.00.
Standard of Review: Findings based on inferences drawn from the evidence will
be upheld unless the logic upon which the inferences are based "is so flawed as to
render the inference clearly erroneous." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ^fl 1, 197
P.3d 628, 631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, <|18, 184 P.3d 791.
Preserved at: R. at 1705-1710 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at
fflfl 1-19); R. 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.121 ln.4 to p.122 ln.2, p.122 ln.23 to p.128 ln.9,
p. 166 In. 13 to p. 167 In. 18); R. 2028 (Tr. Trans, p.438 lns.2-4).
II.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error when it failed to deduct

from the unpaid earnings it imputed to Rita, the $27,207.50 that it found was undisputedly
paid out and spent on marital expenses.
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness and afforded no deference. Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade

1

Square Condo. Homeowner's Assn., 2009 UT App 329 at ^[9, citing Menzies v.
Galetka92006UT81at^|55.
Preserved at: R. at 1707, 1719 (fl3,n.5 and ^60); 1744; 1763; 1832; 1911, 192225 (Decree of Divorce at 1J8 and Exhibit A); 2027 (Tr. Trans, at p. 124 ln.l to p. 125
ln.ll, p.127 lns.8-14); Rita's Exhibit 22, last page.
III.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error when it treated the

entire amount of the $268,729.51 in unpaid after-tax earnings it imputed to Rita as a
fully-liquidated asset in her possession for purposes of dividing the marital estate.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings based on inferences drawn from the
evidence will be upheld unless the logic upon which the inferences are based "is so
flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous." State v. Briggs. 2008 UT 75,
Tjll, 197 P.3d 628, 631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, ^|18, 184
P.3d791. However, questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Daniels v.
Gamma West Brachvtherapv. LLC, 2009 UT 66, f!6, 2009 Lexis 191, citing Ellis
v. Estate of Ellis. 2007 UT 77,1J6, 169 P.3d 441.
Preserved at: R. at 1708-1709 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at
Hfl5-16, 18); 2027 (Tr. Trans, at p.213 In. 10 to p.214 ln.2, p.216 Ins. 11-14); 2028
(Tr. Trans, at p.232 In. 15 to p.233 ln.3).
IV.

Issue: Whether the Decree of Divorce entered by the Trial Court in this case

constitutes a "punitive" decree, which is contrary to Utah law.
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Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Daniels v.
Gamma West Brachvtherapv. LLC, 2009 UT 66, %46(supra).
Preserved at: Plain error.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
1.

Utah Code Ann. §75-5-504 (1993, 2009 Supp.).

2.

Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-802(1), (2) (1993, 2009 Supp.).

3.

Utah Code Ann. §75-7-804 (1993, 2009 Supp.).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a Decree of Divorce entered by the Third Judicial District
Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg presiding. As no minor children
were involved, the primary issues were the division of marital assets and alimony. R. at
01-03. Before trial, the Trial Court ruled that Rita had irrevocably waived her claim for
alimony. See P.. at 1614, 1614a - 1614c.1 As a result, the only issue at trial was the
division of marital assets. Following the August 4 and 5, 2008 bench trial, the Trial Court
took the matter under advisement and, on October 15, 2008, entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, which, inter alia, directed Respondent's counsel to
prepare a proposed Decree of Divorce. R. at 1704 - 1720. Following the April 15, 2009

1

The Trial Court's original Minute Entry appears to have been lost, and a motion
is pending to include a conformed copy of this Minute Entry as part of the record on
appeal.
3

entry of that Decree, Rita filed her Notice of Appeal. R. at 1907-1927, 1968-1969.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

At age 32, Rita finally received her high school diploma through an adult

alternative education program. R. at 2028, Tr. Trans, at p.230 (Rita's testimony that she
graduated in 1988 "through Granite Community Education"); Jim's Ex. 42 (showing
Rita's date of birth as Jan. 26, 1956).2
2.

Except for a few post-high-school vocational/technical classes, Rita has no

other formal education. R. at 2028, Tr. Trans, at p.231 lns.4-7.
3.

The parties began living together in June 1982 and were married on May

26, 1984. R. at 2027, Tr. Trans, atp.41 lns.11-17.
4.

The parties separated on May 10, 2005 and Rita filed this divorce case on

May 12, 2005. R. at 1; 2027, Tr. Trans, at p.42, lns.21-22.
5.

The primary issues were the division of marital assets and alimony. R. at

6.

Pursuant to the parties' "Stipulation Agreement," on October 27, 2005 the

01-03.

Trial Court entered an Order, which, inter alia, designates the parties' separation date as
the date after which "[a]ny wages earned by either party .. . will be considered to be the

2

Petitioner/Appellant Rita's trial exhibits are cited herein as "Rita's Ex." and
Respondent/Appellee, James Richins', trial exhibits are cited as "Jim's Ex." This
particular exhibit, like several other documents in the record, contains handwritten
notations that appear to have been made by the Trial Court.
4

separate property of the party earning those wages .. .." R. at 147-159.
7.

During discovery, Rita obtained information from Respondent/Appellee,

James Richins ("Jim"), indicating that he would be retiring effective December 31, 2006,
and would start drawing his union pension, in which Rita would participate, as of January
1, 2007. As a result, Rita withdrew her claim for alimony. R. at 1521-23, 1534-41.
8.

Sometime after April 4, 2007, Rita received, as a supplemental discovery

response from Jim, a letter to Jim from his union pension trust fund indicating that he was
not, in fact, retiring. R. at 1523, 1554.
9.

By a letter of counsel dated April 19, 2007, Rita informed Jim that she

intended to reinstate her alimony claim based on her recent discovery that he was not
retiring, and offered to cooperate in any additional discovery that Jim might want to
conduct on the issue. R. at 1523, 1556.
10.

Apparently, however, Jim decided not to pursue additional discovery and,

instead, sought to prevent Rita from re-asserting her alimony claim. See facts, infra.
11.

At the Trial Court's request at the February 6, 2008 pretrial conference, the

parties briefed the issue of whether Rita's alimony claim should be reinstated. R. at 15161613.
12.

On May 15, 2008, the Trial Court ruled that Rita's alimony claim would not

be reinstated. R. at 1614, 1614a - 1614c (pending granting of motion to include
conformed copy of lost Minute Entry as part of record on appeal).

5

During the August 4 and 5, 2008 bench trial, Rita testified that:
Her parents established the John and Helen Powell Family Trust (the
"Trust") in 1993. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.95 lns.1-8).
She started assisting her parents with their Trust during August 2000. R. at
2027 (Tr. Trans, p.121 lns.4-7); 2028 (Tr. Trans, p.233 lns.5-7). See also,
Rita's Ex. 22 & 50.
Her parents agreed to pay her $12.00 per hour for some of the services she
provided, and they also agreed to pay her 10% of the rental incomefromthe
trust's rental properties after she took over property management duties in
August 2001. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.121 lns.8-19); R. at 2028 (Tr. Trans,
p. 233 lns.8-11). See also, Rita's Ex. 22 & 50.
Her father died in November 2002. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.95 lns.9-12);
2028 (Tr. Trans, p.233 Ins. 14-23).
In March 2005, she became a co-trustee (with her mother) of the Trust. R.
at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.151 lns.7-9, p.213 lns.12-14); R at 2028 (Tr. Trans.
p.232 ln.24 to p.233 ln.3).
Her mother also gave her a power of attorney. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.96
Ins. 17-18).
The Trust had lacked sufficient liquidity to pay Rita for her services. R. at
2027 (Tr. Trans, p.121 ln.24 to p.123 ln.25, p.127 ln.14 to p.128 ln.9, p.150
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ln.20 to p. 151 ln.2, p.216 Ins. 11-14); 2028 (Tr. Trans, p.237 Ins. 11-24). See
also, Rita's Ex. 50.
h.

Due to litigation initiated by her siblings, a court-ordered freeze on the
Trust's assets was imposed from April or May 2006 to December 2007. R.
at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p. 123 lns.5-25); 2028 (Tr. Trans, p.235 ln.24 to p.236
ln.3). See also, Rita's Ex. 60 (a "Minutes In court Note" from Case No.
063900593, dated May 17, 2006, reflecting the probate court's order that
"the finances of Helen M. Powell [] are to be frozen . . . .") and Rita's Ex.
61, (an Order Modifying Minute Entry from that same case, dated January
28, 2008, which released Mrs. Powell's finances and allowed administration
of the trust according to normal trust procedures and fiduciary duties).

14.

There was no dispute at trial that Rita's mother, Helen Powell, was the sole

current beneficiary of the Trust. See R. at 1374, Affidavit of Helen M. Powell at ^6 ("I
am still the only current beneficiary of the Family Trust.").
15.

Rita also testified that she had prepared an accounting of the time that she

and Jim worked for the Trust up to May 10, 2005, which showed a net amount owed of
$118,699.44, and that she had submitted this accounting to her mother as a claim for
unpaid earnings. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p. 123 Ins. 20-23, p. 124 ln.l to p. 127 In. 14); 2028
(Tr. Trans, p.233 ln.5 to p.234 ln.25); Rita's Ex. 22.
16.

In support of her testimony, Rita introduced her Trial Exhibit 22, which she
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identified as the accounting/unpaid earnings claim that she submitted to her mother, and
which reflected the following facts:
a.

the vast majority of the unpaid earnings were attributable to Rita; and

b.

$27,207.50 was paid out by the trust to Rita between November 5, 2000 and
November 19, 2002 for either "hrs., "wages" or "rental mngmnt." Id.

17.

Rita's Trial Exhibit 22 was admitted without objection. R. at 2027 (Tr.

Trans, p.127 lns.8-14).
18.

In this regard, Rita also introduced her Trial Exhibit 50, a letter from her

mother's attorney, which:
a.

indicated that Rita's wage claim/accounting had been reviewed by her
mother;

b.

stated that the hours claimed appeared reasonable for the time period
involved;

c.

approved Rita's claim for $118,699.44 as "payment in full;" but

d.

stated that the Trust did not currently have sufficient liquidity to pay Rita's
claim. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p. 126 In. 17 to p. 128 ln.9); Rita's Ex. 50.

19.

Rita's Trial Exhibit 50 was also admitted without objection. R. at 2027 (Tr.

Trans, p. 126 lns.22-23, p. 128 lns.7-9).
20.

On cross examination of Rita, Jim introduced his Trial Exhibit 28, a Ford

Credit application, dated July 31, 2004 (the "2004 Credit Application"), indicating that

8

Rita had been employed as an "Estate Manager" by the "Powell Family Trust" for "6"
years and "[blank]" months, and that her "Gross Monthly Salary" was "$3,800." R. at
2027 (Tr. Trans.p.163 lns.19-21, p.166 In. 13 to p.167 ln.18); Jim's Ex. 28.
21.

Although Jim had already at least four times previously introduced into the

record as an exhibit to his discovery-related memoranda another Ford Credit application,
this one dated "10-26-03" (the "2003 Credit Application"), see R. at 324, 347, 428 & 452,
he chose not to introduce this earlier credit application at trial. See R. at 2027, 2028 (Tr.
Trans.); Jim's Ex.'s. The 2003 Credit Application is substantially similar to the
subsequent 2004 Credit Application except in two critical areas: the 2003 Credit
Application states Rita's "Gross Monthly Salary" as "$2400.00" and her "Time on Job"
as "3 Yrs. 2 Mos." R. at 324, 347, 428 & 452.
22.

During that same cross examination, Rita admitted that she "lied" to Ford

Credit in the 2004 Credit Application. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.163 ln.19 to p.164 ln.4).
23.

By way of subsequent explanation, Rita stated that:

a.

the 2004 Credit Application had been signed and submitted by her son,
rather than by Rita herself;

b.

although her name appears on the 2004 Credit Application as an individual,
she applied for this credit on behalf of the Trust;

c.

it was the Trust's gross monthly income, not Rita's, that was stated on the
2004 Credit Application; and
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d.

only Trust monies were used to pay for the vehicles purchased pursuant to
both credit applications. R. at 2027 (Tr. Trans, p.l 11 In.8 to p.l 16 In. 15,
p.161 lns.19-25, p.218 ln.23 to p.220 ln.19); R. at 2028 (Tr. Trans, p.240
ln.12top.2411n.13).

24.

When finding that Rita's "testimony utterly lacks credibility and should be

given weight only to the extent there is corroborating evidence to support it," the Trial
Court based this finding, at least in part, on its subsidiary finding that Rita had admitted to
"lying" to Ford Motor Credit in the 2004 Credit Application to obtain a car loan. R. at
1706 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ^|10).
25.

Nonetheless, the Trial Court exclusively relied on the information in the

2004 Credit Application to impute $3,800.00 per month in income to Rita starting July 1,
1998 and ending May 10, 2005 (the parties' separation date), for a total of $312,740.00 in
unpaid earnings, plus interest, rather than accepting the $118,699.44 that Rita testified to
and was corroborated by her accounting/earnings claim (Rita's Ex. 22), by the letter from
her mother's attorney (Rita's Ex. 50), and by the 2003 Credit Application. R. at 1708,
1719 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order atffi[14560, "Whether or not those
representations to Ford Credit [in the 2004 Credit Application] were truthful, the Court
finds that it is fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner to [them].")
26.

When calculating the unpaid earnings that it imputed to Rita, the Trial

Court did not deduct the $27,207.50 that it had found that the Trust had undisputedly paid
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to Rita and that had undisputedly been "consumed by the parties in meeting their marital
expenses." R. at 1707, 1719 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ^[13 and
n.5,1J60); R. at 1744, 1763 & 1832 (Rita's objections to Jim's proposed Decree of
Divorce for failing to deduct the $27,207.50 from the unpaid income imputed to
Petitioner); R. at 1911, 1922-25.
27.

In making its division of marital assets, the Trial Court found that "[Rita]

had control of the Trust and could have paid herself for her services during that time." R.
at 1708 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ^fl5). As a result, the Decree
of Divorce, entered on April 15, 2009, did the following:
a.

allocated to Rita the entire amount of the unpaid earnings imputed to her for
work performed for the Trust, as if it were a fully-collected asset, in the
after-tax amount of $268,729.51 (the only adjustments were only for unpaid
income taxes and accrued interest, with no adjustment for the $27,207.50
which the parties had already received and spent);

b.

allocated to Rita the marital home valued at $ 181,000.00;

c.

allocated more than $405,000.00 in cash, representing almost all the parties'
liquid marital assets, to Respondent;3

3

Although $48,438.02 in "cash at separation" was allocated to Rita, see R. at
1916 (Decree of Divorce at ^28), the vast majority of this was in her Individual
Retirement Accounts and could not, therefore, be liquidated without incurring significant
income tax liabilities and penalties. See R. at 1910 (Decree of Divorce at Tf8).
11

d.

awarded Jim $45,954.00 in attorney fees; and

e.

granted Jim a $165,144.12 money judgment (a $119,190.12 marital property
differential plus the $45,954.00 in attorney fees) against Rita if she does not
pay him that amount within 15 days. R. at 1910, 1911 & 1916-1918
(Decree of Divorce atffl[6,8, 28, 30 & 32).

28.

On May 1, 2009, Rita filed her Notice of Appeal from that Decree of

Divorce. R. at 1968-1969.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it found that Rita was owed
unpaid pre-tax earnings totaling $312.740.00. Despite having already found that the 2004
Credit Application contained "lies" told by Rita to obtain a car loan, the Trial Court
nevertheless imputed income to her based solely on that document and speculated that she
had made the same monthly income consistently for six years into the past, ignoring
significant corroborating, and even uncontroverted, evidence to the contrary.
The Trial Court further erred when it failed to deduct from the unpaid earnings it
imputed to Rita, the $27,207.50 that was undisputedly received and spent during the
marriage. The Trial Court was apprised several times of this computational error, but
failed to correct it.
The Trial Court also erred when, in dividing the marital estate, it treated the entire
amount of the imputed unpaid earnings as if it was a fully liquidated asset in Rita's hands.

12

It did so by erroneously concluding that Rita could have paid herself at any time because
she was a co-trustee of the Trust, for which she worked, coupled with the fact that she
held a power of attorney for the other co-trustee and the sole current beneficiary of the
Trust, her mother. This was error because it was factually incorrect and because it
required the erroneous legal assumption that Rita could properly ignore her fiduciary
duties and defy a court order freezing those very assets.
Finally, the Trial Court erred because, taken as a whole, the effect of its Decree of
Divorce is punitive. Punitive decrees are contrary to Utah law.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Inferred That Rita
Had $3,800.00 of Unpaid Earnings for Each and Every Month from July 1,
1998 May 10, 2005.4
In dividing the marital estate in this case, the Trial Court was called upon to

determine how much was owed to Rita for services she had provided to the Trust prior to

4

As reflected in its statements that "Respondent contends that Petitioner has
'earned over $45,000 per year since 1995fM and "Respondent claims [Petitioner] began
[working for her parents' trust] in 1995," R. at 1707 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order atfflfl1 & 12), the Trial Court appears to have adopted a typographical
error from Respondents' [sic] Pre-trial Brief. Jim presented no evidence that Rita began
working for the Trust anytime prior to July 31, 1998. The only reference to 1995 in the
entire record (other than in the Trial Court's findings) appears once on page 7 of
Respondent's pre-trial brief. See R. at 1623. Given that every other reference in
Respondent's pre-trial brief is to Rita having started working for the Trust in 1998, see R.
at 1618, 1619, 1621, 1623, 1624 and 1630, it is clear that this one reference to 1995 is
nothing more than a typographical error.
13

the parties' separation. Without allowing the Trust to intervene in this case, see R. at
1475-76, the Trial Court ruled that the Trust owed Rita $312,740.00. In so doing, the
Trial Court ignored significant direct, and even uncontroverted, evidence to the contrary
and, instead, relied on inference and speculation.
A trial court's findings based on inferences drawn from the evidence will be
upheld unless the logic upon which the inferences are based "is soflawedas to render the
inference clearly erroneous." State v. Briggs. 2008 UT 75, Tjl 1, 197 P.3d 628, 631,
quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank. 2007 UT 56, Tfl8, 184 P.3d 791. Whether the logic
behind an inference is clearly erroneous depends on whether it is "'a rational and logical
deduction from facts admitted and established by the evidence, when those facts are
viewed in the light of common experience.'" Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), cert denied 165 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), quoting Bendorf v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft 564 P.2d 619, 624 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977). For
instance, from the fact that certain book entries and invoices included a transportation
charge in addition to the cost of the gravel itself, it was not reasonable for the court to
infer that these sales were made at the point of delivery as opposed to at the gravel pit.
Whitehill Sand and Gravel Co. v. State Tax Commn.. 150 P.2d 370, 372-73 (Utah 1944).
Put another way, findings and conclusions cannot be based on speculation. See, e.g.,
Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT 104 at ^[22, 990 P.2d 933, 938 ("evidence must do more than
merely raise a conjecture"); In re Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983, 986 (Utah 1993) (district

14

court cannot use mere speculation to support its conclusions). "Where there are
probabilities the other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses and
the [finder of fact] should not be permitted to speculate." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT
l04at1f22,990P.2dat938.
Here, the Trial Court inferred that Rita's unpaid income from the Trust was $3,800
for each and every month from July 1, 1998 to the date of the parties' separation on May
10, 2005, a total of 82.3 months, based entirely on Jim's Exhibit 28, the 2004 Credit
Application, which listed Rita's income as $3,800.00 per month and stated that she had
been working for the Trust for six years. R. at 1707-1708. In so doing, the Trial Court
chose to disregard the $118,699.44 that Rita testified she was owed, which was
corroborated by her Exhibit 22 (unpaid wages claim/accounting), by her Exhibit 50 (a
letter from her mother's attorney accepting this amount as "payment in full"), and by the
previously submitted 2003 Credit Application. See Statement of Relevant Facts at f21,
supra. In doing so, the Trial Court necessarily engaged in speculation, ignored
corroborated evidence to the contrary, and erred logically by inferring conclusions based
on a premise that it had already found to be wrong.
Although it is the Trial Court's flawed logic that is fundamentally at issue here, the
evidentiary support for its subsequent inferences is also at issue. Accordingly, the
evidence supporting the Trial Court's inference is marshaled as follows:
•

The 2004 Credit Application indicated that Rita was an "Estate Manager"
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for the "Powell Family Trust," that her "Gross Monthly Salary" was "$3800," and that her
"Time on Job" was "6 Yrs." and "[blank] Mos." See Jim's Ex. 28.
•

Rita admitted on cross examination that she "lied" to "Ford Motor

Company" in the 2004 Credit Application. See R. at 2027, Tr. p.163 In. 19 to p. 164 ln.4.
•

Rita admitted on cross examination that in her prior deposition she told

Jim's counsel that she "agreed with everything that was in [the 2004 Credit Application]."
R. at 2027, Tr. p. 166 ln.24 to p. 167 ln.2.
•

Rita admitted on cross examination that she "was not frank" with Jim's

counsel "many times" during her prior deposition regarding her hope that she would
eventually be paid for the work she had done for the Trust, but for which she had not yet
been paid. See R. at 2027, Tr. p.148 In. 17 to p.150 ln.4.
•

Rita admitted on cross examination that she had "lied repeated times in this

case" in her financial declarations and in her prior deposition "to get what [she]
want[ed]." R. at 2027, Tr. p.134 ln.9 to p.164 ln.13.
•

The 2003 Credit Application, which is substantially similar to the

subsequent 2004 Credit Application, except in two critical areas: the 2003 Credit
Application states Rita's "Gross Monthly Salary" as "$2,400.00" and her "Time on Job"
as "3 Yrs. 2 Mos." R. at 324, 347, 428 & 452.
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•

No other evidence was introduced on this issue.5

In light of the evidence of Rita's prior lack of truthfulness during the discovery
process, and the inconsistencies between the 2003 and 2004 Credit Applications, the Trial
Court was admittedly justified it its finding in paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order that:
Petitioner has knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings (e.g., her financial
declarations) and during her depositions. Through cross examination at trial
Petitioner's [deposition] testimony was repeatedly shown to have been untruthful
and evasive. Not only has Petitioner lied in the context of these proceedings, at
trial Petitioner was forced to admit to lying numerous times in various other
contexts (e.g., to Ford Motor Credit in order to qualify for a car loan . . . ) in order
'to get what [she] want[s].' As a result, the Court finds that Petitioner's testimony
utterly lacks credibility and should be given weight only to the extent there is
corroborating evidence to support it.
R. at 1706 (footnote omitted).6
5

Respondents' [sic] Pre-trial Brief makes reference to other potential evidence
relating to this issue that apparently at one time he intended to try to use. However, no
other evidence was actually introduced, and Rita specifically objected to the Trial Court
relying on Respondent's pre-trial brief rather than on actual evidence. R. at 2028 (Tr.
Trans, p.429 ln.4 to p.430 In. 12). For the Trial Court to have relied on arguments in
Respondent's pre-trial brief in the absence of actual evidence would have been clearly
erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
6

Paragraph 10 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order also makes reference to Rita "lying" to "Salt Lake City Credit Union in an account
application." R. at 1706. This, however, is entirely unsupported by the record. On cross
examination, counsel for Respondent introduced Jim's Trial Exhibit 42, which includes a
Salt Lake City Credit Union "Account Card and Membership Agreement," for
"impeachment purposes." R. at 2027 (Tr. at p. 153 Ins. 13-18). Apparently, Respondent
sought to impeach Rita's credibility by contradicting her prior deposition statements
and/or written discovery responses as to whether she was ever listed as an owner of an
account pertaining to the Trust. See R. at 2027 (Tr. p. 152 ln.3 to p. 157 ln.l). In the
"Account Card and Membership Agreement" portion of Jim's Trial Exhibit 42, the
17

This finding, however, is problematic for the Trial Court when it then uses the
2004 Credit Application as the sole basis for imputing unpaid earnings to Rita.7 Once it
determined that the application contained "lies" told by Rita to qualify for a car loan, how
could any court use the 2004 Credit Application to impute unpaid income to her based on
that very same information? When it did this, the Trial Court put itself in the logically
inconsistent position of finding facts based on information that it had already found was
not true. We want our trial courts to find facts based on information they believe to be
true, not on information they know to be false. Nor is this an estoppel issue. If this were
an action brought by Ford Credit seeking damages based on its reliance on the
ownership section is marked "Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship," and also states:
"Payable on Death to: John and Helen Powell Family Trust." See Jim's Ex. 42. The first
page has information for Rita's parents, John and Helen Powell, and is signed by both of
them, while the second page has information for Rita, and is signed by her. See id.
Nowhere, however, does either page actually indicate who is an account owner. The
second page could just as easily have served as a signature card only. Moreover, the
third, fourth and fifth pages, which are from the April 1 to June 30, 2005 account
statement, clearly show that the account was registered in the name of "John R. Powell"
apparently as a trustee of the "John & Helen Powell Family Trust." See id. The important
thing here, however, is that while Jim's Trial Exhibit 42 arguably shows that Rita may not
have been completely forthright in her prior deposition and/or some of her discovery
responses to Respondent (or more likely that there's confusion on the issue) there is
absolutely no evidence that Rita ever "lied" to Salt Lake City Credit Union in connection
with this or any other account.
7

"Whether or not those representations to Ford Credit were truthful, the Court
finds that it is fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner to the certification she made in that
credit application as an admission against interest." R. at 1708 (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at f 14). In this regard it is also important to note that the
2004 Credit Application itself states: "For the purpose of securing credit from you, I
certify that...." Respondent's Exhibit 28. Thus, the only purpose for which the
information in the application was certified was to obtain a loan from Ford Credit.
18

representations contained in the 2004 Credit Application, a trial court might fairly hold
Rita to those representations. That, however, is not this case. There was no evidence that
Jim relied in any way on the representations in the 2004 Credit Application - other than
choosing to rely on it at trial rather than on the 2003 Credit Application or on some other
potential evidence.
Moreover, there was no rational basis for the Trial Court to impute unpaid income
to Rita based on information it had already found to be a "lie" - regardless of how
distasteful it found Rita to be. That was all the more true given that Rita's testimony, as
reflected in her Trial Exhibit 22 (her accounting/unpaid wage claim), was corroborated by
her Trial Exhibit 50 (the letter from her mother's attorney), which was never
controverted, and the 2003 Credit Application, which the Trial Court apparently forgot
had already been placed before it, and into the record in this case, at least four times.
Perhaps most important is the corroborating evidence found in Rita's Trial Exhibit
50, the July 28, 2008 letter from her mother's attorney, David Ray Carver. This letter
shows that Rita's mother had reviewed Rita's unpaid earnings claim/accounting (Rita's
Ex. 22) with her attorney; that Rita's mother confirmed that Rita had done a lot of work
for her from August 2000 to May 10, 2005; that the hours claimed by Rita were
"reasonable for the time period;" and that Rita's mother approved the payment of
$118,699.44 as "payment in full for that time period." See Rita's Ex.50. There is
absolutely no indication that Rita might have started working for the Trust before August
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2000, or that she was earning $3,800.00 per month. Instead, by accepting Rita's unpaid
earnings claim/accounting, the letter at least tacitly confirms that Rita was earning $12.00
per hour worked starting in August 2000, plus 10% of the rents collected after August 1,
2001; that both Rita's hours and the rents collected varied month by month; and that there
was a correlation between the hours reported by Rita and the amount of work her mother
recalled her performing during the relevant period - all as reflected in Rita's testimony
and her Trial Exhibit 22. Again, Rita's Trial Exhibit 50 remained uncontroverted.
Conversely, Respondent's Exhibit 28, the 2004 Credit Application which the Trial
Court relied upon, admittedly contained "lies," and was not corroborated by any other
evidence presented at trial. In the face of uncontroverted evidence, a trial court cannot
properly rely on evidence it believes to be false to arrive at a different conclusion.
To be fair to Rita, there are really only two areas where she "lied" in the 2004
Credit Application.8 First, she actually started working for the Trust in August 2000,
rather than on or about July 31, 1998 as suggested by the 2004 Credit Application; and
Second, Rita was actually earning only about $2,900.00 per month during the months
leading up to and including July 2004, rather than the $3,800.00 indicated in the 2004
Credit Application. We know that these two areas are the "lies" admitted to by Rita

8

To be really fair, the information provided in the 2004 Ford Credit application
could more properly be classified as overstatements rather than outright "lies." As will be
shown below, Rita overstated her tenure by about 2 years (6 years as opposed to 4) and
her earnings by about $900.00 per month ($3,800.00 as opposed to $2,900.00).
20

because of the differences between the information in the 2004 Credit Application and the
information contained in Rita's testimony and her unpaid earnings claim/accounting that
was admitted as Rita's Trial Exhibit 22,9 both of which were corroborated by the letter
from her mother's attorney (Rita's Ex. 50) and the 2003 Credit Application. It was
undisputed, that as of July 31, 2004 Rita was assisting her mother in managing the
"estate" owned by the Powell Family Trust.
Rita's trial testimony was also corroborated by the 2003 Credit Application. Three
years and two months prior to October, 26 2003 would be August 2000, which is when
Rita testified she began working for her parents. And, $2,400.00 per month corresponds
very closely to Rita's testimony that she was earning $12.00 per hour starting in August

9

With respect to Rita's start date, the first, fourth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and
thirteenth pages of Rita's Exhibit 22 all show that she started working for the Trust in
August 2000. The first page is a summary sheet starting the calculations in August 2000.
The fourth page reflects Rita's hours on a daily and weekly basis starting the work week
of August 20 to 26, 2000. The tenth page shows the 10% of rents Rita also started
earning in August of 2001. The eleventh page shows a summary of Rita's hours by
month, starting with August 2000, with the payments received, totaling $27,207.50, noted
next to the month in which they were received. The twelfth page shows the same
summary information as on the eleventh page, but without the payment information. The
thirteenth page again shows the total of $27,207.50 actually received, payment by
payment, starting on 11/15/2000.
With respect to Rita's earnings around July 2004, the eighth page (hourly detail), the tenth
page (10% of monthly rents), and the eleventh and twelfth pages (hourly summaries by
month) show us that Rita actually earned $3,007.00 in January 2004, $2,752.50 in
February 2004, $2,578.50 in March 2004, $3,522.50 in April 2004, $3,044.50 in May
2004, $2,263.50 in June 2004, and $3,070.50 in July 2004. Thus, only once during this
seven month period did Rita come within about $300.00 of making the $3,800.00 monthly
earnings indicated in the 2004 Credit Application.
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2000, plus 10% of the Trust's rental revenues starting August 2001. See also, Rita's Tr.
Ex. 22 (Rita averaged 211.375 hours per month from Jan. 2003 through Oct. 2003, which
would be a monthly average of $2,536.50 for her hourly earnings, plus 10% of the
$2,702.50 average gross rents for the same period, or $270.25, gives an average monthly
total earnings of $2,806.75). In making its findings on this issue, however, the Trial
Court apparently forgot that Jim had already placed the 2003 Credit Application before it,
and into the record in this case, at least four times prior to trial.
Logical deduction and common experience also tell us that it is highly unlikely that
Rita's parents agreed to pay her a salary of $3,800.00 per month, or $45,600.00 per year,
to manage their trust estate - especially as far back as 1998. Rita was 32 years old before
she obtained even a high school diploma. The only additional formal education she
received were a few vocational/technical classes. She has no formal background in
accounting or finance - subjects that one would expect a professional trust manager to
understand fairly well, especially if the manager was being paid $45,600.00 per year!
Rita's lack of professional understanding clearly shows through in her struggles to
explain to the Trial Court: (1) The structure of the Trust that had only recently been the
subject of probate court litigation brought by her siblings;10 (2) When she actually became

10

Compare R. at 2027, Tr. p.95 ln.l to p.96 ln.25 (Rita's attempted explanation)
to R. at 2027, Tr. p.99 In. 18 to p.102 In. 15 (counsel's explanation to the Trial Court).
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a co-trustee of her mother's revocable portion of the Trust;11 and (3) The assets currently
owned by the Trust.12 Given Rita's lack of formal education and clear struggles in this
area, logic and common experience much more strongly suggest that her parents would be
paying for her assistance at the hourly rate of $12.00, which is what Rita's testimony and
her Trial Exhibit 22 reflected, her mother's attorney confirmed by letter (Rita's Ex. 50),
and is corroborated by the 2003 Credit Application, rather than being paid an annual
salary of $45,600.00 as a professional trust estate manager as the Trial Court inferred
from the 2004 Credit Application.
Moreover, even if the Trial Court had found that the information in the 2004
Credit Application were actually true, which it clearly did not, there are two additional
inferences it made that are unsupportable. First, the Trial Court could not reasonably
infer that Rita made $3,800.00 each and every month over a span of more than six years;
and second, the Trial Court had no basis from which to infer that Rita began working for
her parents on July 7, 1998 rather than on July 31, 1998.

11

See R. at 2027, Tr. p. 151 lns.7-9 ("I don't - six years, seven -1 don't know.");
R. at 2027, Tr. p.213 ln.12 to p.214 ln.l ("[I'm confused because] there was papers made
up when my dad was sick [, which my mother signed but he didn't, and tjhere was papers
made up later on."); R. at 2028, Tr. p.232 ln.24 to p.233 ln.3 (Where Rita finally
concludes that she became a co-trustee in March 2005, when she was appointed by her
mother after her father's death.).
12

See R. at 2028, Tr. p.237 ln.l 1 to p.238 In. 13 ("[I]t owns three duplexes . . .
three condemned properties on 7th West... some other unliveable properties . . . [and]
three vacant lands. . .. And it owns the home that my, well, that's my mom's. I don't
know that that's owned by the trust, the home my mom lives in.").
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In deciding how much Rita earned while working for the Trust, the only
reasonable inference the Trial Court could make from Respondent's Exhibit 28 (if it had
not already found that the 2004 Credit Application contained "lies") was that as of July
31, 2004 Rita had a gross monthly salary of $3,800.00. It was illogical and defies
common experience to further infer, without any supporting evidence, that Rita had
continuously made the same $3,800.00 each and every month all the way back six years to
July 1998. Common experience tells us that employees will get raises over the course of
six years so that what they earned six years ago is likely to be significantly less than what
they earn today. As a result, this inference by the Trial Court is clearly erroneous.
In addition, the 2004 Credit Application, says that Rita had worked for the "Powell
Family Trust" for "6" years and "[blank]" months. Six years prior to July 31, 2004 is July
31, 1998, not July 7, 1998, which is the date the Trial Court began imputing income to
Rita. While it is possible that "6 years" means a bit more than six years, it is equally
possible that "6 years" means something less than six years. It is also significant that the
space on the application to include the number of months, in addition to years, that the
applicant has been on his or her present job was left blank. Thus, even if all the
information in the 2004 Credit Application actually were true, the earliest date the Trial
Court could have reasonably inferred as Rita's start date would have been July 31, 1998,
which was 81.3 months, not 82.3 months, before May 10, 2005. It was pure speculation
for the Trial Court to place Rita's start date on July 7, 1998.
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In light of the foregoing, the Trial Court clearly erred in imputing income to Rita
based on the 2004 Credit Application, which it acknowledged to contain "lies," rather
than on Rita's own testimony, which was corroborated by Rita's Exhibits 22 and 50, and
by the 2003 Credit Application; and the Trial Court should be reversed on this issue.
II.

The Trial Court Also Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to Deduct
from the Unpaid Earnings it Imputed to Rita the $27,207.50, Which Was
Undisputedly Received and Spent on Marital Expenses During the Marriage.
As clearly pointed out by the Trial Court in paragraph 13 and footnote 5 of its own

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Rita's testimony and her Exhibit 22
were undisputed as to the fact that $27,207.50 was actually paid to Rita by the Trust, and
"consumed by the parties in meeting their marital expenses." R. at 1707.13 Moreover,
this fact was at least tacitly corroborated by the letter from Rita's mother's attorney
(Rita's Ex. 50) when it accepts Rita's unpaid earnings claim/accounting (Rita's Ex. 22).
Nevertheless, and despite repeated opportunities to correct its mathematical error, the
Trial Court failed to deduct this amount from the unpaid earnings it imputed to Rita as a
marital asset. R. at 1719, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at *[f60; 1744,
1763, 1832, 1911, 1922-25, Decree of Divorce at ^[8, 28 and Exhibit A thereto.

13

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ^13, n.5 ("Petitioner asserts,
and Respondent does not dispute, that [the $27,207.50] was consumed by the parties in
meeting their marital expenses."). See also, R. at 2027, Tr. p. 124 ln.l to p. 125 ln.l 1,
p. 127 Ins.8-14; Rita's Tr. Ex. 22 (especially the last page which is a print-out accounting
report of payments from the "Helen Powell Family Trust" to Rita from 11/15/00 to
11/19/02, totaling $27,207.50, and referring to "wages," "hours" and "mngmnt").
25

A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and afforded no
deference. Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo. Homeowner's Assn.,
2009 UT App 329 at Tf9, citing Menzies v. Galetka. 2006 UT 81 at ^{55.
The Trial Court, itself, found that Rita's evidence regarding her receipt of the
$27,207.50 and its expenditure for marital expenses was undisputed.14 It was a clear error
of law to find that this amount had been received and expended on marital expenses, and
to then fail to subtract it from the unpaid earnings imputed to Rita. Even if the Trial
Court's statements in paragraph 13 and footnote 5 of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order are not seen as rising to the dignity of an actual finding of fact, it still
would be against the clear weight of the evidence, and an abuse of discretion, for the Trial
Court to have failed to make such a finding in the face of Rita's undisputed testimony,
which was corroborated by the print-out accounting report of what was paid to her from
the Trust (the last page of Rita's Ex. 22), and as further corroborated by the letter from
Rita's mother's attorney (Rita's Ex. 50).

14

Arguably, there is the possibility of adjusting the $27,207.50 down by a total of
$3,108.00, to $24,099.50, to reflect the hours worked by Jim. See Rita's Tr. Ex. 22
(showing that Jim worked a total of 259 hours at $12.00 per hour for total earnings of
$3,108.00). However, because there is no way of knowing whose earnings were paid by
the Trust between 11/15/2000 and 11/19/2002, see last page of Rita's Ex. 22, because the
vast majority of the hours claimed were worked by Rita, and because Jim testified that he
was never paid for the work he did for the Trust, see R. at 2028, Tr. p.386 ln.4 to p.388
ln.4, to make such a deduction would be speculative at best. But see, R. at 2028, Tr.
p.425 Ins.3-12, where Rita testifies that Jim was paid but that he had his payments
included in the checks made out to her in order to avoid being discovered as working
while collecting unemployment benefits.
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In light of the foregoing, the Trial Court clearly erred when it failed to deduct the
from the unpaid earnings imputed to Rita the $27,207.50 that was undisputedly paid to
Rita and spent on marital expenses during the marriage, and it should also be reversed on
this issue. This is yet another example that illustrates that the Trial Court's division of
marital property in this case was impermissibly punitive, as argued in Section IV, infra.

III.

The Trial Court Also Committed Reversible Error When it Treated the
$268,729.51 in After-tax Unpaid Earnings it Imputed to Rita as a Fullyliquidated Asset in Her Hands When Dividing the Marital Estate.
In deciding how to divide the marital estate, the Trial Court ruled that Rita, as a co-

trustee of the Trust and the holder of a power of attorney for her mother, could have paid
herself what she was owed at any time. R. at 1707, 1708 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order atffl[13515).15 As a result, the Decree of Divorce allocates to Rita the
entire amount of unpaid earnings imputed to her for work she performed for the Trust,
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Paragraph 13 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order indicates that Rita "now concedes that.. . she has chosen not to collect [the amount
she is owed by her parents' trust]." R. at 1707. Rita conceded no such thing. Rita's
position was that she had not been paid for her services because: (1) the Trust had lacked
sufficient liquidity; and (2) there was a court-ordered freeze on the Trust's assets from
May 2006 until December 2007. R. at 2027 (Tr. at p.96 In. 15 to p.98 ln.9; p.121 ln.24 to
p.123 ln.25; p.l26 In. 17 to p.128 ln.9; p.151 lns.7-9; p.193 ln.23 to p.194 ln.4; p.213 ln.12
to p.214 ln.l); 2028 (Tr. at p.232 ln.24 to p.233 ln.3). Rita's testimony was corroborated
by her Trial Exhibit 50, the letter from her mother's attorney stating that the Trust was not
currently able to pay what it agreed it owed to Rita, her Trial Exhibit 60, a certified copy
of "Minutes Incourt Note" showing that the probate court had ordered a freeze on all of
Helen Powell's finances in May 2006, and her Trial Exhibit 61, a certified copy of an
order from a December 2007 hearing where the probate court modified its prior order and
lifted the freeze on the Trust's assets.
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adjusted for unpaid income taxes and interest, or $268,729.51, as though it were a follyliquidated asset, and grants Jim a $165,144.12 money judgment against Rita if she does
not pay him within 15 days. R. at 1910, 1911 & 1916-1918 (Decree of Divorce atffi[6, 8,
28, 30 & 32). In ruling on these issues, the Trial Court: (1) inferred that the Trust either
had, or that Rita could have caused it to have, sufficient liquidity to pay her what she was
owed; and (2) assumed that Rita could have paid herself out of Trust funds without
violating her duties to her parents, especially her elderly mother.
A trial court's findings based on inferences drawn from the evidence will be
upheld unless the logic upon which the inferences are based "is so flawed as to render the
inference clearly erroneous." State v. Briggs. 2008 UT 75,111, 197 P.3d 628, 631,
quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, fl8, 184 P.3d 791. Questions of law are,
however, reviewed for correctness. Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009
UT 66,146, 2009 Lexis 191, citing Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, | 6 , 169 P.3d 441.
The evidence supporting the Trial Court's inferences is marshaled as follows:
•

Rita testified at trial that her parents created the John and Helen Powell

Family Trust in 1993; that because her father died on November 2, 2002, and following
some court hearings, the Trust needed to be divided into two trusts; that she is a co-trustee
with her mother over her "mother's trust;" that her mother is the sole trustee over her
"father's trust;" that she has a power of attorney for her mother; that her mother actually
manages her father's trust; but that she helps her mother by carrying out the day-to-day
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management. R. at 2027, Tr. at p.94 In. 16 to p.98 ln.9.16
•

Rita testified at trial that she and her four siblings each received $500.00

per month in gifts from Trust funds starting in May 2001 and ending in January 2005. R.
at2027,Tr.atp.l221ns.6-17. 17
•

Rita testified at trial that starting in 2001 she funded two $3,000.00 IRA's

from her $500.00 monthly gifts. R. at 2027, Tr. at p.91 ln.l to p.94 In. 9, p.122 lns.18-22.
•

On cross examination, Rita testified that she had been a trustee for the Trust

for "I don't - six years, seven -1 don't know." R. at 2027, Tr. at p.151 lns.7-9.18
1

Because of Rita's limited ability to explain the legal details relating to the Trust
to the Trial Court, Rita's appellate counsel, who represented her in recent probate court
litigation brought by her siblings, and who also appeared specially on behalf of Rita at
trial to assist trial counsel with Trust-related issues, explained to the Trial Court that the
Trust was a common joint revocable living trust; that at the death of Rita's father it split
into two trusts, an irrevocable credit shelter trust, preserving Rita's father's unified
federal gift and estate tax credit, and a marital trust, that remained fully revocable by her
mother; that some Trust assets belonged to the credit shelter trust, over which Rita's
mother was the sole trustee; and that the remaining assets belonged to the marital trust,
over which Rita and her mother were co-trustees. R. at 2027, Tr. at p.99 In. 18 to p. 102
ln.15.
17

In a clear reference to her parents, Rita testified that "they were talked into
giving everybody $500 a month when they sold their motel, which was on payments, but
that was just long as the payments were coming in on the motel." R. at 2027, Tr. p. 122
Ins.8-11. Rita later clarified that "everybody" included herself and her four siblings. Id. at
Ins. 12-14. Thus, her parents' trust was paying out $2,500.00 in gifts each month from
May 2001 until January 2005, for a total of $95,000.00.
18

Rita subsequently explained that she was confused about when she became a
co-trustee because "there was papers made up when my dad was sick [and t]here was
papers made up later on." R. at 2027, Tr. p.213 Ins. 12-22. She also testified that her
father didn't sign the papers that were drawn up when he was sick. See id. at p.213 ln.23
to 214 ln.l. Ultimately, Rita concluded that she became a co-trustee in March 2005. R.
29

•

On cross examination, Rita testified that the Trust owns some real estate

rental units and is worth over a million dollars. M. at Ins. 18-23.
•

On redirect, Rita further testified that the Trust's assets were three duplexes,

three condemned properties on 7th West, three more "unliveable properties," "three vacant
lands," and that it also had some bank accounts, the actual balances of which she didn't
then recall. R. at 2028, Tr. p.237 ln.l 1 to 238 ln.13.
•

Rita admitted that she has had check writing authority for the Trust since

"7/10/01." R. at 2027, Tr. at p.153 lns.4-9; Respondent's Exhibit 42.
•

Rita admitted that her mother made her a $50,000.00 loan "from the trust

accounts or whatever" in September 2005. R. at 2027, Tr. at p. 157 lns.2-13.
•

On cross examination, over foundation and hearsay objections, counsel for

Respondent had Rita read into the record a hearsay statement from a purported balance
sheet for the Trust to the effect that it was worth $3,205,218.08 on September 13, 2000.
R. at 2027, Tr. atp.177 ln.3 top.179 ln.18.19
at 2028, Tr. p.232 ln.24 to p.233 ln.3.
19

Rita testified that this ancient purported balance sheet was prepared by someone
who was "on his way out;" that this person's job did not include preparing balance sheets
for the Trust; that it was "inaccurate" in that it presented as valuable assets things that
"were already losses at the time;" and that she thought this balance sheet was prepared "to
confuse people." R. at 2027, Tr. at p.178 ln.16 to p.179 ln.9. On redirect, Rita further
testified that:
A lot of those monies that are reported on it were lost prior to this date. They were
embezzled, extorted. Some of the properties had been sold. There's also property
here t h a t . . . isn't even deeded to my family.
30

•

Rita admitted that she didn't submit a claim for her unpaid earnings to the

Trust until approximately June 2008. R. at 2027? Tr. p.137 ln.24 to p.138 ln.22; 2028,
Tr.p.2361ns.l8-21.
•

It was undisputed that the trust agreement authorizes payment of

compensation for services rendered by its trustees. R. at 1707, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at n.6.
The Trial Court made no finding that the Trust actually had enough liquid funds at
any given time to have fully paid Rita for her services. There simply wasn't enough
evidence from which the Trial Court could have made such a finding. Indeed, as shown
herein, the preponderance of the evidence was to the contrary. Instead, the Trial Court
inferred that Rita had exercised full control over the Trust;20 that the Trust had enough
R. at 2027, Tr. p.223 lns.4-13. The purported balance sheet, itself, was never admitted
into evidence.
20

From the outset, the Trial Court assumed that Rita's mother was incapacitated
and that Rita exercised full control over the Trust. See e.g., R. at 2027 (Tr. p.96 In. 15 to
p.98 ln.9 "The Court: Who is the trustee [of Rita's father's trust]? The Witness: My
mother. The Court: Okay, but you have power of attorney? The Witness: I have power
of attorney. The Court: So you 're essentially acting as trustee? The Witness: I do help,
yeah. . . . The Court: [but ijfthe mother is not competent which is the impression I've
been given - Ms. McGee: The mother has never been adjudicated to be incompetent. ..
. The Court: Okay. So you're the one that['s] carrying out the day-to-day management of
it? The Witness: I carry, yeah." (Emphasis added)). See also, R. at 2027 (Tr. p. 193 ln.23
to p. 194 ln.4 "The Court:. .. Your client is the trustee of the trust. Who else was involved
in deciding if the trust was going to pay for this? (Referring to Rita's unpaid earnings
claim/accounting.) Ms. McGee: It was - it was solely her mother's decision as trustee, as
sole trustee. The Court: She's a co-trustee and she's the one that has power of attorney to
act on her mother's behalf Ms. McGee: The letter that was already put into evidence
shows that it came from her mother and her mother's attorney." (Emphasis added.)). No
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total assets to have paid her; and that she could have at least sold assets and used the
proceeds to pay herself had she wanted to. Arguably, there was enough evidence to
support these inferences as matters of actual fact.21 However, the other, and even more
important, question is whether Rita legally could have done so. Without making a
specific ruling on this question, the Trial Court assumed that she could.
There is no question that Rita received check writing authority for the Trust from
her parents in 2001. Nor is there any question that by March 2005 Rita was a co-trustee
with her mother over her "mother's trust," and that she also had a power of attorney for
her mother, who was the sole trustee over her by then deceased "father's trust." The real
problem, however, lies in the duties that Rita owed to her parents, at first as their

evidence was introduced at trial with respect to any lack of capacity on the part of Rita's
mother, and it would be improper for a trial court to assume incapacity without a specific
ruling to that effect. Nevertheless, the Trial Court carried its assumption that Rita had full
control over the Trust into its findings. See, e.g., R. at 1708 (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at ^15 "Petitioner had control of the Trust and could have
paid herself for her services . . . [but] chose to not withdraw those funds . .. ."); 1709
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order "the evidence before the Court strongly
suggests that Petitioner has exercised full control over the Trust's assets and has used the
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal interest.").
In addition, the Trial Court effectively shut down Rita's attempt to explain how a
trustee's conflict of interest can result in a violation of her fiduciary duties. See R. at
2028, Tr.p.232 Ins. 15-23.
21

But see, Restatement (3d) of Trusts, §171 (2003), comment e., "The trustee
cannot properly commit the entire administration of the trust to an agent, co-trustee, or
other person . . . ." {emphasis added).
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employee, and later as a trustee and attorney-in-fact for her mother.22 As their employee,
clearly Rita could not write checks that were not authorized by her parents. As trustee
and attorney-in-fact for her mother, Rita could not take any action with respect to the
assets of the Trast that would conflict with the fiduciary duties she owed to her mother to
administer the Trust in her mother's interest.
Among the fiduciary duties owed by Rita to her mother are the duty of loyalty and
the duty of prudent administration. With regard to a trustee's duty of loyalty, Utah Code
Ann. §75-7-808(1) (2009) provides that "[a] trustee shall administer the trust solely in
the interests of the beneficiaries'" {emphasis added)?2" "The trustee violates the duty of
loyalty . . . when the trustee uses trust property for the trustee's own financial []
purposes." Restatement (3d) of Trusts §170, comment 1. (2003).24 With regard to a
trustee's duty of prudent administration, Section 75-7-804 of the Utah Code provides:
A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.

~ As set forth in the Statement of Material Facts, |14, supra, there was no dispute
at trial that Rita's mother, Helen Powell, is the sole current beneficiary of the Trust.
23

See also. Restatement (3d) of Trusts §2 (2003), comment b., "a person in a
fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to
matters within the scope of the relationship;" Restatement (2d) of Trusts §170 (1959)
comment a., "[a trustee] is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary . . . "
24

See e ^ , In re Estate of West 948 P.2d 351, 353-355 (Utah 1997), trustee must
deal with trust property for the benefit of the current or "active" beneficiaries of the trust,
as distinct from contingent beneficiaries, and "a trustee's transfer of trust property to
himself. . . may constitute a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty . . . , " citing
Restatement (2d) of Trusts §2 (1959).
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In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and
caution.
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-804 (1993, 2009 Supp.).
Similarly, with respect to the duties owed by an attorney-in-fact to his principal,
the 2008 Utah Supreme Court case of Eagar v. Burrows provides:
[An attorney-in-fact] has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit
in all matters connected with the agency relationship. . . . [This] requires that the
agent subordinate the agent's interests to those of the principal and place the
principal's interests first... and to exercise prudence and s k i l l . . . .
[TJransactions that place a fiduciary in a position inconsistent with [the interests
of the person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed] because of the fiduciary's
competing self inter est are prohibited as self dealing . . . without regard to the
adequacy of consideration, the honesty of intent or the lack of fraud.
Eagar v. Burrows. 2008 UT 42,ffi[25,32, 191 P.3d 9, 15-16 (treating the duties of an
attorney-in-fact as being similar and analogous to a trustee's duties).25 Thus, even where
it is undisputed that a trust agreement allows for payments to its trustees for the services
they render to it, that cannot be the end of the inquiry. If the timing of such payments
would violate the trustees' duties of loyalty and/or prudent management, then the trustee
cannot pay himself at that time.
Rita's uncontroverted and well-corroborated testimony was that the Trust's assets
were frozen due to litigation initiated by her siblings from May 2006 until December

25

Citing 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency §21 (2007), Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01
& comment b. (2006), NatT Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d
909, 918 (Utah 1993), In re Estate of Harrison, 2000 PA Super. 19, 745 A.2d 676, 680
(PA Super. Ct. 2000).
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2007, and that, even when the trust assets were not frozen, there was insufficient
liquidity to pa> her and meet the Trust's other obligations at the same time. See R. at
2027 (Tr. p.12 L ln.20 to p.123 ln.4, p.216 lns.l 1-14). This lack of liquidity was
corroborated by Rita's Trial Exhibit 50, the July 28, 2008 letter from Rita's mother's
attorney stating, at about the same time as the trial in this case, that the Trust lacked
sufficient liquidity even to pay the approximately $119,000.00 it agreed that it owed Rita.
Even assuming that the hearsay statement that the trust was worth approximately
$3.2 million dollars back in 2000 was properly admitted, and that it actually had some
basis in reality, it is entirely plausible that the Trust nevertheless lacked sufficient
liquidity to pay Rita for her work while acting in the interest of its beneficiaries, primarily
Rita's mother, and serving the purpose for which it was created.
First, many of the Trust's assets, especially its liquid assets, could have been used
up by Rita's elderly parents in the intervening eight years between the 2000 balance sheet
and the time of trial in this case in 2008. Apparently, they had engaged in a fairly
aggressive gifting program pursuant to which they gave a total of $95,000.00 in cash to
their children between December 2001 and January 2005. Then there were the litigation
costs that must have been incurred in connection with the probate court litigation brought

26

R. at 2027, Tr. p. 123 lns.5-25, p. 150 ln.20 to p. 151 ln.2; 2028, Tr. p.235 ln.24 to
p.236 ln.3., p.255 In. 16 to p.256 ln.3, p.259 In. 24 to p.265 ln.24; Rita's Ex. 60 (minutes
of probate order freezing Helen Powell's assets); Rita's Ex. 61 (order unfreezing the
assets of Rita's parents' trusts).
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by Rita's siblings that led to the freezing of all of Rita's mother's finances in May 2006,
and to unfreezing them in December 2007. Last, but certainly not least, Rita's parents
also must have needed significant funds to support themselves during those eight years.
Second, the only evidence the Trial Court had of the assets that comprised the
Trust was that it primarily consisted of relatively illiquid real property, most of which
either had title problems, was occupied by buildings that were condemned or were
otherwise "unliveable," or was raw land. The only evidence was that of all its real estate
holdings, the Trust owned only three duplexes from which it could receive rental income.
To be sure, Rita testified that her parents had sold a motel on payments, but those
payments must have been significantly depleted by her parents' aggressive gifting
program. Given these liquidity challenges, it is easy to see how the Trust would have had
difficulty paying Rita for her work while simultaneously meeting the financial needs of
her elderly parents, which presumably is its primary purpose.
Third, just because a parcel of real property can be sold at a given point in time,
doesn't mean that would be prudent or in the best interest of the beneficiaries to do so.
Very frequently, a parcel of real property will bring a significantly better price if it is
properly prepared for sale. Apparently, a significant number of the parcels of real
property owned by the Trust are occupied by buildings that are in need of either
significant repairs or demolition before they can be properly marketed. Both of these
efforts require money - money that Rita testified would not have been there if she were
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being paid for her work. Moreover, as the recent nation-wide declines in real estate
prices amply demonstrate, it is not always a good time to be selling real estate. Further, it
almost goes without saying that it would be very difficult for Rita to sell parcels that had
title problems - at least until those problems were resolved, which, again, would require
both time and money. Thus, it cannot automatically be said that Rita could have sold
Trust assets to pay herself, as it may very well have constituted a conflict of interest for
her to have done so.27
Regarding trustee conflict of interest transactions, Section 75-7-802(2) of the Utah
Code Provides:
75-7-8G2. Duty of loyalty.
(2) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided
in Section 75-7-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the
investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the
trustee's own personal account or which is othej*wise affected by a conflict between
the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected
by the transaction . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-802(2) (1993, 2009 Supp.) {emphasis added).
With respect to conflict of interest transactions involving attorneys-in-fact, Section
75-5-504 of the Utah Code similarly provides:
75-5-504. Voidable transactions.
Any loan, sale, or encumbrance on behalf of a principal with his attorney-in-fact,

27

See e ^ Dovle v. Union Ins. Co.. 277 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Neb. 1979), "A trustee is
required to dispose of trust property on the most advantageous terms which it is
reasonably possible for him to secure for the benefit of those whom he represents."
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or with the attorney-in-fact's spouse, agent, or attorney, or any entity or trust in
which the attorney-in-fact has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction
involving the attorney-in-fact which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest,
is voidable unless the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested
persons and others as directed by the court.
Utah Code Ann. §75-5-504 (1993, 2009 Supp.) {emphasis added).
Thus, any sale of any parcel of Trust property by Rita for the purpose of raising cash to
pay herself with, and any writing of any check by Rita to pay herself if those funds were
needed for other more important Trust purposes, would be a conflict of interest
transaction that would be voidable at Rita's mother's discretion. Clearly, Rita needed to
be very cautious about taking measures designed to pay herself under these
circumstances. Hence the unpaid earnings claim/accounting she submitted to her mother
and her mother's attorney that became Rita's Trial Exhibit 22.
Perhaps more importantly, however, is why should it matter to the Trial Court if
Rita could, or could not, have paid herself during the years leading up to the parties'
separation? Despite the language in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order, there was no evidence that Rita was choosing to hide her earnings in the
Trust prior to her separation from Jim. Why should she? In fact, what evidence there is
strongly suggests that Rita was actually being paid as the Trust could afford to pay her,
especially given its depletion for other purposes. See also, discussion regarding the
$27,207.50 that was actually paid out and spent on marital expenses, supra. Conversely,
the fact that Rita could not get paid following the parties' separation, up through,
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including and following the date of trial, is pretty well established by the probate-courtordered freeze of the Trust's assets from May 2006 through December 2007, see Rita's
Ex.'s 60 & 61, and by the concurrent lack of liquidity in the Trust. See Rita's Ex. 50.
Again, the Trial Court's inclination to impute nefarious motives to Rita, and to extract a
toll from her because of them, especially when evidence supporting such motives is
lacking, causes great concern regarding the punitive effect of the Decree of Divorce in
this case, as set forth more fully in argument IV, infra.
In light of the foregoing, the Trial Court simply did not have enough evidence to
support the factual inferences it made as to the actual and/or potential liquidity of the
Trust, especially without taking into consideration the legal restrictions that Rita's
fiduciary duties placed upon her. Indeed, the evidence preponderates to the contrary.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand why it should matter so much to the Trial Court
whether Rita was able to pay herself prior to her separation from Jim. As a result, the
Trial Court should be reversed on this issue as well.

IV.

The Decree of Divorce Entered in this Case Is a "Punitive" Decree, Which Is
Contrary to Utah Law.
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Daniels v. Gamma West

Brachytherapv. LLC. 2009 UT 66, TJ46, 2009 Lexis 191, citing Ellis v. Estate of Ellis,
2007 UT 77, €J6, 169 P.3d 441. Utah law requires that divorce decrees not be punitive:
[T]he purpose of [a divorce property] settlement should not be to impose
punishment upon either party. . . . [T]here is no authority in our law for
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administering punitive measures in a divorce judgment, and [] to do so would be
improper . . . . When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is to consider the
various factors relating to the situation and to arrange the best possible allocation
of the property and the economic resources of the parties so that the parties . . . can
pursue their lives in as happy and useful manner as possible.
Ready. Read. 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979), quoting Wilson v. Wilson. 296 P.2d 977
(1956), and citing English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Although it may not initially appear to be punitive on its face, the effect of the
Decree of Divorce entered in this case (the "Decree") is punitive as to Rita; the fact of
which should have been obvious to the Trial Court, especially in light of its underlying
rulings. "Plain error requires the showing of a harmful error that should have been
obvious to the district court." Utah Chptr. of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd.. 2009 UT
76, Tf26, 664 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, citing State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, ^|13, 10 P.3d 346.
By definition, a punitive decree entails a harmful error. See Read v. Read, supra.
In addition to denying her any alimony, the Trial Court's erroneous imputation of
$268,729.51 in unpaid after-tax earnings to Rita leaves her with only $191,171.35 in
marital assets, or only 33.45% of the marital estate; compared with Jim's $380,372.83,
which is 66.55%. This is before the Trial Court's award of attorney fees to Jim.28 That,

28

The Decree awards Rita the entire $268,729.51 in unpaid after-tax earnings it
imputed to her, as if it were a fully-liquidated asset, awards her the marital home, which it
values at $181,000.00, and awards her $48,438.02 "cash at separation" - which is mostly
comprised of her illiquid IRA accounts. R. at 1908-1911, 1916 & 1917. To balance this
out, the Decree then awards Jim: (1) $405,719.50 in "cash at separation," which includes
almost all the parties' liquid marital assets; and (2) an asset balancing adjustment of
$119,190.12. R. at 1909-1910, 1916-1917. However, once the $118,669.44 in unpaid
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in and of itself, is at least at, if not actually across, the punitive borderline as it allocates
virtually 2/3 of the marital assets to Jim. But that is not all, the nature of the assets
awarded is not equitable either.
The Trial Court had to know which assets were reasonably liquid and which were
not. Yet, the Decree awards virtually all the liquid assets to Jim and places Rita in the
position of losing the marital home. The Decree orders Rita to pay a total of $165,144.12
to Jim within 15 days, or that amount will be reduced to a judgment that Jim can then
enforce. R. at 1917-1918.29 However, the parties' assets at the time of their separation,
and at trial, both of which are set forth in the Decree, clearly show that Rita could not pay
Jim the amount ordered without either selling the marital home or draining money from
the Trust. R. at 1910-11, 1916-17. It is obvious that, at best, Rita could only conduct a
fire sale of the marital home within the 15 days provided by the Trial Court, especially in
light of the fact that Jim's name still shows of record on the title. At the same time,
however, the Trial Court could not reasonably expect Rita to drain money from the Trust
earnings actually owed to Rita are adjusted for taxes at a rate of 33%, which is the same
rate the Trial Court used, they become only $79,528.62. When that amount is added to
the other assets awarded to Rita, her net total becomes only $310,362.07, rather than the
$499,562.95 stated in the Decree. Taking from this the $119,190.12 balancing
adjustment ordered in the Decree and giving it to Jim would leave Rita with only
$191,171.35 in net marital assets, or only 33.45%, compared with Jim's $380,372.83, or
66.55%.
29

The Decree adds a $45,954.00 award of attorney fees to its $119,190.12 asset
balancing adjustment, and orders Rita to pay the total of $165,144.12 to Jim within 15
days or a money judgment in that amount will automatically be entered against her. R. at
1917-18.
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without impacting her fiduciary duties to her mother - even if the Trust currently had
$165,144.12 in cash, which it did not. The letter from Rita's mother's attorney (Rita's
Ex. 50) was not disputed and clearly stated that the trust did not currently have sufficient
funds to pay even the $118,669.44 it says it owes Rita. (See also, argument III above.)
As a result, not only does Rita end up with a disproportionately small share of the marital
estate, but the Decree clearly opens the door for Jim to attach and sell the marital home
out from under her. That is a punitive result that, as more fully set forth above, the Trial
Court clearly should have recognized when it entered the Decree.
Further, the record in this case, including but not limited to the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and the Decree of Divorce itself, leaves
one with the unmistakable impression that the Decree's terms were disproportionately
impacted by Rita's lack of truthfulness in her financial declarations, in her deposition, and
in the 2004 Credit Application. In addition to the erroneous rulings discussed more fully
above, the following concerns stand out:
First, when addressing the issue of Rita's request for a fault-based decree the Trial
Court initially noted that Jim's conviction for domestic violence against Rita could
support a decree based on Jim's fault. However, the Trial Court then makes the troubling
finding that "if Petitioner insists on a fault-based divorce, the Court finds that fault
should be equally assigned to both parties" R. at 1706, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order at ^}10 (emphasis added). This is troubling because the Trial Court sets
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forth its evidentiary basis, which is not anything related to the marriage itself, but instead
is the Trial Court's other finding that:
Petitioner has knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings (e.g., her
financial declarations) and during her depositions. Through cross
examination at trial Petitioner's [deposition] testimony was repeatedly
shown to have been untruthful and evasive. Not only has Petitioner lied in
the context of these proceedings, at trial Petitioner was forced to admit to
lying numerous times in various other contexts (e.g., to Ford Motor Credit
in order to qualify for a car loan, to the Salt Lake City Credit Union in an
account application) in order 'to get what [she] want[s].'
Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted).30
The conduct specified by the Trial Court clearly impacts the proceedings and,
therefore, the potential allocation of attorney fees. But, except for the Ford Motor Credit
and Salt Lake City Credit Union applications, which didn't even involve Jim, all of this
conduct occurred after the parties had separated and a petition for divorce was filed.
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand what relevance it could have
regarding Rita's "fault" in the failure of her marriage to Jim.
Second, despite the very significant policy issues inherent in alimony claims (see
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-5(1), (8) (2009) and Sill v. Sill 2007 UT App 173, 164 P.3d
415), and after being placed on notice that there was a strong probability that its prior
ruling on that issue might be appealed, the Trial Court refused even to permit Rita's trial
counsel to proffer for the record what her alimony evidence would have been had she

30

But see, footnote 6, supra, demonstrating that Rita did not make any false
representations to Salt Lake City Credit Union.
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been permitted to present it. R. at 2027, Tr. p. 12 Ins. 1-19.
The Trial Court's apparent displeasure regarding Rita's lack of prior candor
seemingly permeates its rulings in this case. These rulings resulted in the Decree, which
has a cumulative effect that is punitive. Utah law with respect to punitive decrees is very
clear, and it is difficult to see how the Trial Court could have failed to recognize that the
Decree it was entering would have a punitive effect on Rita.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the Trial Court committed reversible error
when it found that Rita was owed unpaid pre-tax earnings totaling $312.740.00. Despite
having already found that the 2004 Credit Application contained "lies" told by Rita to
obtain a car loan, the Trial Court nevertheless imputed income to Rita based solely on that
document, ignoring significant and corroborated evidence to the contrary, and speculated
that Rita had made the same monthly income consistently for six years into the past.
The Trial Court further erred when it failed to deduct from the unpaid earnings it
imputed to Rita, the $27,207.50 that it acknowledged was undisputedly received and
spent during the marriage. The Trial Court was apprised several times of this
computational error, but failed to correct it.
The Trial Court also erred when, in dividing the marital estate, it treated the entire
amount of the $268,729.51 in unpaid after-tax earnings it imputed to Rita if it were a
fully- liquidated asset in her hands. It did so by erroneously concluding that Rita could
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have paid herself at any time because she was a co-trustee of the Trust, for which she
worked, coupled with the fact that she held a power of attorney for her mother, who was
the other co-trustee and the sole current beneficiary of the Trust. This was error both
because it was factually incorrect, and because it required the erroneous legal assumption
that Rita could properly ignore her fiduciary duties to her mother and defy a court order
freezing those very assets.
Finally, the Trial Court erred because, taken as a whole, the effect of its Decree of
Divorce is punitive; and punitive decrees are contrary to Utah law.
For all of these reasons, the Trial Court's ruling in this case should be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /P<clay of February, 2010,1 mailed via U.S. mail,
first-class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF to the following:
Tom D. Branch, Esq.
TOM D. BRANCH, LLC
1350 E Draper Pkwy
Draper, Utah 84020
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee James E. Richins

46

APPENDIX
75-5-504. Voidable transactions.
Any loan, sale, or encumbrance on behalf of a principal with his attorney-in-fact, or with
the attorney-in-fact's spouse, agent, or attorney, or any entity or trust in which the
attorney-in-fact has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction involving the
attorney-in-fact which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable unless
the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested persons and others as
directed by the court.
Utah Code Ann. §75-5-504 (1993, 2009 Supp.).

75-7-802. Duty of loyalty.
(1) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
(2) Subject to Ihe rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in
Section 75-7-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own personal
account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and
personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless:
(a) the transaclion was authorized by the terms of the trust;
(b) the transaction was approved by the court;
(c) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time allowed by
Section 75-7-1005;
(d) the beneficiary consented to the trustee's conduct, ratified the transaction, or released
the trustee in compliance with Section 75-7-1009; or
(e) the transaclion involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the trustee before
the person became or contemplated becoming trustee.
(3) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with:
(a) the trustee's spouse;
(b) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses;
(c) an agent of the trustee, including but not limited to an attorney, accountant, or
financial advisor; or
(d) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, or a person that owns
a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee's best judgment.
(4) A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern trust property
but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the trustee retains significant
influence over the beneficiary and from which the trustee obtains an advantage is
voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee establishes that the transaction was fair to
the beneficiary.

(5) A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages in the
trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if
the transaction concerns an opportunity properly belonging to the trust.
(6) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust
to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee is
not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the
investment complies with the prudent investor rule of Section 75-7-901. The trustee may
be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those
services out of fees charged to the trust.
(7) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar interests in
other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. If
the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of enterprise, the trustee shall
elect or appoint directors or other managers who will manage the corporation or
enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
(8) This section does not preclude the following actions by the trustee:
(a) an agreement between the trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or
compensation of the trustee;
(b) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee;
(c) a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, conservatorship, or
guardianship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest;
(d) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial service institution operated by the trustee;
(e) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust;
(f) collecting, holding, and retaining trust assets received from a trustor until, in the
judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made, even though the assets
include an asset in which the trustee is personally interested;
(g) acquiring an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any trust
capacity, holds an undivided interest;
(h) borrowing money to be repaid from the trust assets or otherwise;
(i) advancing money to be repaid from the assets or otherwise;
(j) employing persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even
if they are associated with the trustee:
(i) to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee's administrative duties
or perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary; or
(ii) to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations;
(k) if a governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in United States
government obligations, investing in those obligations, either directly or in the form of
securities or other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type investment
company or investment trust registered under the provisions of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if:
(i) the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States
government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully collateralized by United
States government obligations; and

(ii) the investment company or investment trust takes delivery of the collateral for any
repurchase agreement either directly or through an authorized custodian.
(9) The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to any
proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the trustee.
Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-802 (1993, 2009 Supp.).

75-7-804. Prudent administration.
A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In
satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-804 (1993, 2009 Supp.).
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